
When the Bullet Leaves the Barrel: Use of Force Reporting in American Law Enforcement

Peter W. Fenton
Kennesaw State University

Statutes and official policies notwithstanding, American law enforcement officers exercise substantial, virtually unbridled discretion in the use of force during any police-civilian encounter. Therefore, in order to monitor and control the use of force by officers in the field, it is imperative that law enforcement agencies at all levels of government create and enforce effective policies and procedures for the documentation and subsequent evaluation of all use-of-force incidents. The purpose of this study is to examine the various considerations for law enforcement agencies in the development and implementation of effective use-of-force reporting policies and procedures. The study will also address the utility of capturing and evaluating information gleaned from use-of-force reports.

Police officers possess awesome powers. They perform their duties under hazardous conditions with the vigilant public eye upon them. Police officers are permitted only a small margin of error in judgment under conditions that impose high degrees of physical and mental stress. Their general responsibility to preserve peace and enforce the law carries with it the power to arrest and to use force—even deadly force. It is essential, therefore, that these sweeping powers be subject to constant scrutiny to ensure that they are not abused.

—Alpert and Smith 1999, 58

On a late December night in 2002, two off-duty city police officers working security at a downtown club attempted to break up a fistfight between two young male patrons of the club. Throwing a final punch at his adversary, one young man, D.W., struck one of the officers on the side of the head, knocking his eyeglasses to the floor.¹ At this, both officers drew and “loaded” their ASP batons, striking D.W. several times in an effort to subdue him. One

officer later reported that he swung his baton at the suspect's shoulder, but accidentally struck a "glancing blow" to the side of the suspect's head, causing the young man to fall to the floor and strike his head against a wooden bench. The officers then arrested the young man and summoned EMS to treat his wounds. Paramedics determined that D.W.'s wounds were severe enough to require treatment at the local hospital emergency room. After his treatment and release from the hospital, D.W. was jailed on a number of charges related to the fight and the assault on the officer.

In keeping with departmental policy (Atlanta Police Department 1980), before EMS arrived at the club, the officers called for an on-duty supervisor to come to the scene. Upon his arrival, the sector sergeant spoke to the two officers, examined the suspect's wounds, and then went back into service. Neither the two involved officers nor the sergeant interviewed or took statements from several civilian witnesses to the incident. Both officers later wrote and filed incident reports describing the encounter. The sergeant wrote nothing regarding the incident.

Photographs of the young man's wounds taken shortly after his release from jail show three distinct lacerations to the head, all roughly the same length and consistent with three blows to the head from a police baton. Bruising of the face and body are also visible in these photographs. Subsequent witness statements, taken by the young man's attorney in anticipation of a lawsuit, paint a different picture of the incident from that described by the two officers in their official reports. These witnesses consistently asserted that the two officers struck the young man repeatedly on the head and upper body with their batons and then kicked and punched him after he fell to the floor. None reported seeing him strike his head on a bench or any other object. A lawsuit was later filed by the young man against the involved officers and the city alleging both state and federal claims. The matter is still pending.

The Sergeant's Dilemma

All three police officers followed their department's policy on reporting the use of force. The two officers actually involved in the incident contacted their immediate (on-duty) supervisor and described the use of force within their standard incident reports. The sergeant got a verbal report from the officers, determined that no further action was necessary, and simply countersigned the incident reports. The matter came to the attention of the police department's command staff only after the city and the officers were

served with the lawsuit alleging various tort and civil rights violations.

The department's use of force policy in effect at the time of this incident required only that the use of force be documented within the involved officers' incident reports (Atlanta Police Department 2001). No unique or additional documentation was required.

The sergeant in this case becomes the gatekeeper of information regarding the force that was used against D.W. He is the sole determiner of whether the chain of command is to be made aware of the level of force used against this particular person as well as whether or not a detailed account of the incident will be memorialized. If not, the details of the incident, spotty as they are, will be buried within the two officers' incident reports. These will not be read by anyone in the chain of command unless and until a formal complaint is lodged or a lawsuit is filed by the one upon whom force was used. In effect, the sergeant must decide if he is to be an informant, a whistle-blower, or a co-conspirator. The sergeant is given absolute discretion in determining whether or not the infliction of serious bodily harm by two of his subordinates comes to light.

If the sergeant in this actual incident is like many throughout the United States, he is what is known as a "working sergeant," that is, he performs supervisory duties but is also expected and required to answer calls for service as do the officers under him. The "working sergeant" is essentially a patrol officer with extra responsibility, only one step up the chain of command and certainly not a part of the agency's management. Further, since he works side-by-side with the officers under his supervision, relying on them to be his backup, he is much more likely to be sympathetic with his subordinates, to align himself with them in any dispute or controversy, and thus, with the discretion vested in the sergeant in this scenario, he is not likely to assume the role of whistleblower. For example, a study of use of force reporting in Austin, Texas revealed that out of 6,447 reported incidents, only one contained a supervisor's assessment that the involved officer had done anything wrong (Rodriguez and Alford 2004).

Use of force incidents such as the one described above are quite common in law enforcement nationwide, and certainly such incidents occur frequently within the State of Georgia. Studies vary in their estimation of the frequency of use of force incidents (Hickman, Piquero, and Garner 2008). In reviewing a number of such studies, Alpert and Dunham (2000) conclude that eight percent is the most accurate estimate of police-civilian encounters across the country that result in the use of force, to varying degrees, by the officers

involved. A 1996 study that applied a broad definition of force estimated the incidence of force at twenty percent (McEwen, quoted in Rahtz 2003, 17).

Studies have revealed that the manner in which police use of force incidents are reported throughout the United States varies widely, and there is reason to suspect that many such incidents are not officially reported or recorded at all (Pate and Fridell 1995). Alpert and Dunham, in a comprehensive report prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice in 2000, found that “[m]any or most agencies do not keep use-of-force information, and others maintain reports only if there are injuries, potential injuries, or verbal complaints (of involved suspects or citizens) as a result of a confrontation” (I-3). Indeed, the formal documentation of use of force incidents by American law enforcement is a relatively new practice (Alpert and Dunham 2004, 1; Pate and Fridell 1995). My own experience as a former police officer, a criminal justice consultant, and a professor of criminal justice, indicates that there are no uniform standards within Georgia law enforcement agencies for reporting use of force incidents. Indeed, during my fourteen years working for the Cobb County Police Department, a major metropolitan law enforcement agency, our use of force reporting policy was similar to the one cited above. No special report was required and no procedures were in place that mandated a review of each and every incident involving force (Greer 2008).

Mandatory Reporting: A Necessity

The research cited in this study reveals the utility in capturing and evaluating information gleaned from law enforcement use of force reports as well as the need for a comprehensive mandatory reporting procedure imperative for all incidents that involve the use of force. This is an important issue for a number of reasons. First, our law enforcement officers are, by virtue of their authority and the realities of the job, vested with unbridled discretion in using force in any encounter in the field. Whether or not an agency has policies in place, whether or not adequate training on the use of force and the limits thereupon is available, each officer has *de facto* discretion to make use of force decisions, right or wrong, lawful or unlawful. The decision by an officer to use force of any kind often has permanent and irrevocable consequences for person against whom the force is used as well as for the individual officer and his or her department. The phrase used in the title of this study, “When the bullet leaves the barrel,” is part of an admonition I use whenever I address law enforcement officers on the legal limitations on use of force: “When the

bullet leaves the barrel, you can't call it back." In all instances, no sincere apologies, no corrective or disciplinary action, no after-the-fact revisions to training curricula or policies, no amount of compensatory or punitive damages awarded in court, can reverse the damage done by an officer's use of excessive and unjustifiable force. Mandating consistent, accurate use of force reporting, coupled with a systematic review by an agency's chain of command, primarily sends a message to officers in the field that they will be held strictly accountable for every blow struck, every injury inflicted, every shot fired.

Secondly, systematic use of force reporting will allow a law enforcement agency to identify and analyze deficiencies in policy, training, and supervision in regard to individual officers as well as the agency as a whole (Terrill 2003). Severity and frequency of force incidents can be evaluated for officers, shifts, precincts, and the agency as a whole. Certainly the information gleaned for properly prepared use of force reports can be invaluable to law enforcement agency executives in evaluating individual officer performance. Some agencies, such as the Miami, Florida Police Department, have established an "early warning system," whereby an officer's performance in the field is subjected to particular scrutiny whenever a certain number of use of force reports are filed by any particular officer within a specified time period (Lersch, Bazley, and Mieczkowski 2006). Done properly, this system of "flagging" an officer who has been involved in an extraordinary number of use of force incidents will not be perceived as merely an effort to stifle, oppress, or punish officers who are assertive on the street, who are proactive, or who may simply work high-risk assignments such as narcotics enforcement or patrol in high-crime areas (Adams 1996, 60; Lersch, Bazley, and Mieczkowski 2006). Rather, such a system can serve to improve training, enhance officer safety, reduce exposure to civil liability, and increase community confidence (U.S. Department of Justice 2002; NAACP 2008).

This "early warning system" is facilitated by a mandatory use of force reporting and review process. Such careful scrutiny serves to reduce the likelihood that inevitable force incidents will involve excessive, unjustifiable force on the part of involved officers, thereby reducing citizen complaints and lawsuits against officer and agency (Rahtz 2003, 99).

Standards and Model Policies

There are several resources available to American law enforcement agencies that provide either standards or actual model policies for use of force reporting. The Commission for Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) has established standards for reporting use of force that must be adopted in order that an agency receive CALEA accreditation (McEwen 1997). CALEA standards require that an accredited law enforcement agency require a written report whenever an officer discharges a firearm in the field, causes injury or death, applies force via lethal or less lethal weapons, or applies “weaponless physical force at a level designated by the agency” (CALEA 2006, Standard 13.6). Further, CALEA standards require that certified agencies adopt a written procedure for administrative review of use of force reports (Standard 13.7).²

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) offers model policies that any law enforcement agency may adopt; unlike CALEA, the IACP has put forth actual draft policies; adoption of these is not a requirement of membership in the organization.

The IACP (1997) model requires the following:

- An immediate verbal report by an involved officer to a supervisor;
- A detailed written report by the involved officer, separate from the standard incident report;
- A written report from any officer who witnesses a use of force by a fellow officer;
- An on-scene investigation by the supervisor;
- A separate report filed by the supervisor;
- A notification of the shift commander;
- Notification by the shift commander to an internal affairs investigator if the use of force resulted in the death or hospitalization of a suspect;
- A review by the shift commander of all use of force incidents not investigated by internal affairs;
- A review by the unit commander of the shift commander’s findings; and
- A final review by internal affairs of the findings of the unit commander.

Thus, under this model, supervisors at a minimum of three levels up the chain of command will evaluate the use of force incident. Documentation separate from the standard incident report is required from both the involved officer and the immediate supervisor.

What About Georgia?

In the State of Georgia are approximately 1,300 state and local law enforcement agencies and 58,000 officers on active duty (Keheley 2008). One hundred fifty-nine of these agencies are sheriffs' offices. A statewide survey of agencies' use of force reporting policies and practices has not been conducted, so it is not possible to draw any conclusions about adequacy and efficacy of polices as they exist. What is known is that as of 2008 only thirty-seven Georgia law enforcement agencies have received CALEA accreditation and ten are in the process of applying for it (CALEA 2008). In addition, anecdotal evidence gathered from my years as both observer and participant in the criminal justice system indicates substantial divergence in departmental use of force reporting policies and practices within the state. The ready availability of standards and model policies does not assure that any particular agency will adopt and enforce an appropriate policy.

In Georgia are state counterparts to both CALEA and IACP. The State of Georgia Law Enforcement Certification Program (GLECP), formed by a coalition of law enforcement executives and county and city government associations, was established in 1996. This certification program has issued a manual containing 118 standards outlining "best practices" for Georgia law enforcement agencies (GLECP 2008, 3). Upon proof of compliance with all 118 standards, a Georgia law enforcement agency is granted state certification, and it is recognized that such certification is a substantial step toward achievement of CALEA accreditation. Thus, it is not surprising that the use of force reporting standards contained in the GLECP manual are virtually identical to those of CALEA.

In Georgia is also a Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police (GACP), modeled after the IACP (see <http://www.gachiefs.co/>). The Georgia association endorses and participates in the Law Enforcement Certification Program. In addition, like the IACP, the GACP has developed a set of model policies, including ones regarding use of force reporting. The GACP guidelines, however, contain some contradictory provisions. The section of the model policy entitled "Reporting Control to Active Resistance" contains the

following requirements that are to be met following a use of force incident:

- An immediate verbal report by the involved officer to a supervisor;
- Detailed documentation of the use of force *within the incident report* (emphasis added);
- An on-scene investigation by the supervisor;
- Preparation of a Report to Control Active Resistance (RCAR) *by the supervisor* (emphasis added); and
- Submission by the supervisor of the involved officer's reports and the RCAR to the "chain of command for review." (GACP 2008, SOP Chapter 11-2 Section V)

However, in a subsequent section labeled "S.O.P. 11-3 Reporting Requirements for Use of Non-Deadly Force/Internal Procedures" these procedures are outlined:

- An immediate verbal report by the involved officer to a supervisor;
- Preparation of an RCAR *by the involved officer* (emphasis added);
- A supplemental report by any officer witnessing a use of force by a fellow officer;
- An on-scene investigation by the supervisor;
- A review by the supervisor of the officer's RCAR;
- Preparation by the supervisor of a memo to the agency's chief executive officer, confirming the accuracy of the RCAR or explaining any discrepancies; and
- Forwarding the RCAR and the supervisory memo through the chain of command to the chief executive officer. (GACP 2008, SOP Chapter 11-3 Section II)

The inconsistency here is problematic. The first section of the GACP guidelines allows the involved officer to document the use of force within the incident report; the supervisor is the one to submit the actual use of force report, called RCAR by the GACP. The section identified as an SOP (standard operating procedure) requires that the involved officer prepare the RCAR with the supervisor submitting only a supplementary memo.

A quick glance at use of force reporting policies from three diverse Georgia law enforcement agencies reveals the extent of the divergence in such policies throughout the State. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation (2005) requires a supervisor to investigate and document all use of force incidents that either result in injury or involve the use of deadly force, less-lethal weapons such as batons or pepper spray, or “counter moves” such as striking or kicking, regardless of whether or not injury occurs. The City of Dalton Police Department (1998) mandates that the involved officer submit a use of force report whenever force is used on a suspect or in “any situation which the officer feels may result in a complaint.” The University of West Georgia Police Department policy, though, contains some confusing provisions. Officers involved in use of force incidents must complete a report, but this document is referred to as both a Use of Force/Firearms Report and an Offense Report/Use of Force/Firearms Report. The language of the policy seems to state that in some instances the standard incident report will suffice to document the use of force. In addition, the policy does not specifically require that a supervisor respond to the incident scene, only that the supervisor complete an investigation within 48 hours (University of West Georgia 2009). Such disparity in policies and practices among Georgia law enforcement agencies reveals the difficulty that would arise in attempting to conduct a statewide analysis of the use of force by Georgia law enforcement officers or in establishing uniform statewide protocols.

Defining Use of Force

All the aforementioned standards and model policies also define the types of police-suspect encounters in which a use of force report must be submitted. In the strictest sense, force can be defined as any conduct from merely placing hands on another person up to the use of deadly force. CALEA, IACP, GLECP, and GACP all wisely mandate a use of force report whenever a suspect is injured or complains of injury, or whenever deadly force is used, regardless of whether or not injury or death results. This is a more practical approach than establishing a threshold on the so-called “force continuum,” a conceptual tool often used in law enforcement training to illustrate the relationship between suspect resistance and lawful use of force. The “force continuum” focuses on escalating levels of force that have the *potential* to result in incrementally greater harm to a resistant or combative suspect; it does not take into account actual injury to a suspect (Alpert and Dunham

2000; Terrill, et al. 2003). Therefore, this paradigm is not an appropriate frame of reference for establishing the parameters of incidents requiring use of force reporting. Identifying exactly when a report must be submitted is a critical component. One study suggests that twice as many force incidents may occur as are officially reported, depending on how the term force is defined by the agency (Adams 1996, 62). Without a clear definition of the level of force that triggers a specific reporting procedure, the supervisor who conducts a contemporaneous investigation of the incident is given inordinate discretion in determining which incidents require such reporting. This is a critical issue because the on-scene supervisor is ultimately the best resource for accurately documenting the facts and circumstances of any use of force (Alpert and Smith 1999; Terrill, et al. 2003).

The national accreditation and state certification standards stop short of offering specific policies ready for adoption by any agency seeking the respective sanction. It is the IACP and GACP, both voluntary membership organizations, that provide specific, albeit non-binding model policies for use by any law enforcement entity with little or no modification. Despite some variations and the internal inconsistency of the GACP model, the model policies have the certain key points in common. Each requires that all use of force incidents be documented separately from the standard incident report; all officers who participate in or witness the use of force must submit separate reports. Both model policies mandate that a supervisor must go to the incident scene, conduct a contemporaneous investigation, and submit some type of report containing the supervisor's findings. In each model, all such reports are forwarded through the departmental chain of command for review. Although it is not clearly defined in the policies themselves, one can assume that upon the chain-of-command review, appropriate disciplinary action will be taken if it is determined that the documented use of force was unlawful or in violation of departmental regulations.

According to Buchanan, "It does absolutely no good to have a well-written, up-to-date use-of-force policy if your personnel do not know the policy or the proper method to apply it" (quoted in McEwen 1997, 41). Merely drafting and enacting effective policies is not enough. Many law enforcement agencies in Georgia and throughout the United States, including some that have good policies on the books, fail to promulgate these policies within their own departments and fail to train their officers adequately on either the quantity or quality of information required in their use of force reports (Coleman 2007). To do so requires engaging in what can be called

the “3 T’s”—tell it, train it, test it. “Tell it” refers to the need to assure that every officer and civilian employee is provided with their own copy of the agency’s policies and procedures; it is necessary to print copies of the manuals and hand them out. “Train it” means that every employee, sworn and civilian alike, must receive meaningful training on the application of all policies. Finally, “test it” recognizes that the best way to assure that the training is effective, and thus that the content of the policies is clear, is to test employees on their understanding of the policies after their training. In an August 2000 Concepts and Issues Paper, the IACP itself notes, “[t]here are several aspects of a successful reporting policy training program. The policy must be disseminated to all personnel, understood by all personnel, and complied with by all personnel.” (4). Without proper training, much information that can and should be captured in a use of force report will never be recorded or, at best, will be buried within the standard incident report (Terrill, et al. 2003, 153).

Another important issue not included in these model policies and perhaps better addressed via separate policies is the ultimate use to be made of the information contained in use of force reports. As noted above, appropriate disciplinary action should follow any use of force determined to be improper. However, on a larger scale, the collective data can be useful to a law enforcement agency in a variety of ways. To this end CALEA offers some insight and rationale. The commentary to CALEA Standard 1.3.6 contains the following statement of intent:

The intent of this standard is to establish use of force or response to resistance reporting systems within the agency for effective review and analysis.... The reporting systems should identify trends, improve training and employee safety, and provide timely information for the agency addressing use of force issues with the public. Early and accurate reporting helps establish agency credibility.

It is evident that CALEA recognizes the establishment and maintenance of a use of force reporting system as an essential management tool for any law enforcement agency. Thus, implementation of such a reporting system is mandatory for agencies seeking CALEA accreditation.

Conclusion

Studies on the phenomenon of police use of force consistently decry the fact that across the country no universal standard has been established for the collection and subsequent evaluation of police use of force data. This lack of consistency is obviously a major obstacle to the accurate collection and evaluation of data. Some have called for the establishment of a national standard for the reporting of police use of force incidents (Alpert and Smith 1999; Pate and Fridell 1995). However, we must not forget that from its earliest days one of the fundamental principles of American law enforcement has been local control; we do not have, nor will we ever have a national police force as exists in other countries. Therefore, although organizations such as CALEA and the IACP can and do provide guidelines and model policies, no organization has the authority to mandate a nationwide, universal standard for use of force reporting.

As noted above, even the best set of policies is worthless unless the policies are promulgated and enforced. When it comes to collecting use of force data accurately, certainly American law enforcement should take heed of a concept from the field of information management, “GIGO,” that is, garbage in, garbage out. It appears that in many cases, law enforcement agencies carry this notion a step further, resulting in “NINO”—nothing in, nothing out. Further, it must be acknowledged that corrupt, inept, or lazy officers and supervisors may always be able to abuse or circumvent any departmental force reporting policies by simply ignoring them or by providing false or inaccurate information. However, a well-written, comprehensive use of force reporting policy, supported by proper dissemination and training of all to whom the policy applies, sets an appropriate and justifiably high standard of conduct and serves notice to officers and to the community at large that any and all use of force incidents are expected and required to be documented and evaluated, with proper corrective action taken when necessary.

In Georgia, there has been no statewide survey of law enforcement policies and practices in regard to use of force reporting. Given the significance of the issue and the sheer number and diversity of law enforcement agencies in our state, perhaps a study of this type is in order. With such information in hand the question will still remain as to whether or not a uniform statewide system of reporting use of force incidents is desirable, is feasible, and will be supported by the state’s 1,300 law enforcement agencies. Ultimately, if such questions are addressed, the answers must come from either the legislature

or a rulemaking authority such as the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council.

Notes

¹ The identities of the parties in this incident have been concealed because as of this writing the matter is still in litigation.

² The law enforcement agency whose officers were involved in the incident described in this paper has subsequently revised its use of force reporting policy to comply with CALEA standards.

References

- Adams, Kenneth 1996. "Measuring the Prevalence of Police Use of Force." In *Police Violence*, edited by William A. Geller and Hans Toch. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 52-93.
- Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Roger G. Dunham. 2000. *Analysis of Police Use of Force Data*. U.S. Department of Justice Document #183648.
- _____. 2004. *Understanding Police use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and Reciprocity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Michael R. Smith. 1999. "Police Use of Force Data: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going." *Police Quarterly* 2(1): 57-78.
- Atlanta Police Department. 1980. *Employee Work Rules*. August. Rule 2.53.
- _____. 2001. *Roll Call Training Document*. August. APD TM RCT 01.07.
- Coleman, Todd. 2007. "Documenting the Use of Force." *The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 76(11): 18-23.
- Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies. (CALEA). 2008. *CALEA Online*. Accessed October 31, 2008. Available online at <http://www.calea.org/agcysearch/searchagcy3.cfm>.
- _____. 2006. "Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies." *CALEA Online*. Accessed October 31, 2008. Available online at <http://www.calea.org/Online/Clientonly/standards.htm>.

- Dalton Police Department. 1998. *Use of Force Policy*. GO88-5.1. *Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police*. Accessed October 31, 2008. Available online at http://www.gachiefs.com/pdfs/NEWS_FullTaserReport-June2005.pdf.
- Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police. (GACP). 2008. *Sample Law Enforcement Operations Manual*. Accessed October 31, 2008. Available online at http://www.gachiefs.com/DeptResrcs_SamplePolicyManual.htm.
- Georgia Bureau of Investigation. (GBI). 2005. "GBI Use of Force Report." Directive 10-2. *Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police*. Accessed October 31, 2008. Available online at http://www.gachiefs.com/pdfs/NEWS_FullTaserReport-June2005.pdf.
- Georgia Law Enforcement Certification Program. (GLECP). 2008. *Standards Manual*. Fourth edition. Accessed October 31, 2008. Available online at <http://www.gachiefs.com/statecertification/pdfs/4th%20Edition%20-%20Complete.pdf>.
- Greer, Mary D. 2008. Email communication with the author. 5 March.
- Hickman, Matthew J., Alex R. Piquero, and Joel H. Garner. 2008. "Toward a National Estimate of Police Use of Nonlethal Force." *Criminology and Public Policy* 7(4): 563-604.
- IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center. 2000. *Reporting Use of Force: Concepts and Issues Paper*. Alexandria, VA: IACP.
- International Association of Chiefs of Police. (IACP). 1997. *Model Policy – Reporting Use of Force*. Alexandria, VA: IACP.
- Keheley, T.L. 2008. Email communication with the author. 17 January.
- Lersch, Kim M., Tom Bazley, and Tom Mieczkowski. 2006. "Early Intervention Programs: An Effective Police Accountability Tool, or Punishment of the Productive?" *Policing* 29(1): 58-76.
- McEwen, Tom 1997. "Policies on Less-Than-Lethal Force in Law Enforcement Agencies." *Policing* 20(1): 39-54.
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. (NAACP). 2008. "Talking Points: Excessive Use of Force." *The NAACP Is Today*. Accessed February 19, 2009. Available online at http://www.naACP.org/advocacy/justice/force_points/index.htm.
- Pate, Anthony M., and Lorie A. Fridell. 1995. "Toward the Uniform Reporting of Police Use of Force: Results of a National Survey." *Criminal Justice Review* 20(2): 123-45.

- Rahtz, Howard. 2003. *Understanding Police Use of Force*. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
- Rodriguez, Erik, and Andy Alford. 2004. "Blacks Bear the Brunt When Police Use Force." January 25. *Austin American-Statesman*. Accessed February 27, 2009. Available online at <http://www.statesman.com/specialreports/content/specialreports/useofforce/0125force.html>.
- Terrill, William 2003. "City of San Antonio, Texas Use of Force Analysis July 1, 2001-December 31, 2002." November 6. *Official Website of the City of San Antonio*. Accessed February 27, 2009. Available online at <http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/pdf/UOFcomplete.pdf>.
- Terrill, William, Geoffrey P. Alpert, Roger G. Dunham, and Michael R. Smith. 2003. "A Management Tool for Evaluating Police Use of Force: An Application of the Force Factor." *Police Quarterly* 6(2): 150-71.
- U.S. Department of Justice. Community Relations Service. 2002. "Police Use of Force: Addressing Community Racial Tensions." *United States Department of Justice*. Accessed February 27, 2009. Available online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/crs/pubs/pubbullpoliceuseofforcedraftrevision72002.pdf>.
- University of West Georgia. 2009. "Response to Resistance/Aggression Policy." Accessed February 28, 2009. *University of West Georgia University Police*. Available online at http://www.Westga.edu/police/index_2342.php.