

1. Why does Pike contend that God's foreknowledge and human free will are incompatible?
2. When does Hume regard "past experience as a full proof of the future existence of . . . [an] event" (277) and why does he believe that proof against the occurrence of miracles "is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined (279)?"
3. Inwagen contends that we need to replace Hume's "'property-complement' account of an event's being contrary to experience" (292) with an account that considers "what it is reasonable to believe" (292); and that, for this reason, Hume's argument against miracles "is a failure" (293). Reconstruct Inwagen's criticism of the 'property-complement' account and explain why Inwagen thinks that replacing the 'property-complement' with the 'reasonable belief' account shows that Hume fails to prove that belief in "a miracle-report . . . would be wholly unreasonable" (293).
4. How does a rejection of Platonic dualism figure into Russell's contention that "it seems scarcely probable that the mind survives the total destruction of brain structure which occurs at death" (337)? How can Hick agree with Russell on this point and nonetheless suggest that, through the sovereign love of God, there can "be a new existence beyond the grave" (340)?
5. How does Olen reconcile "materialism and life after death" (353)?
6. What is James's 'religious hypothesis'; why does he think it a 'genuine option'; and what gives us the right to believe the religious hypothesis absent "sufficient evidence" (377)?
7. Why does Pascal think a person acts "stupidly" (365) who wagers that God is not?
8. Why does Hick hold that there can be "rational theistic belief without proofs" (384)?
9. Why does Pojman characterize faith in God as "desperate hope" (421), thereby eschewing "the usual notion that makes a propositional belief that God exists a necessary condition for faith" (412)?
10. How does Dawkins support the claim that "science is not religion" (427)?
11. How do John Paul II and Stephen Jay Gould concur as concerns the nonoverlapping magisteria of religion and science?
12. Why does Kitcher speculate (in jest?) that Behe's style of IDT denies the evolutionary mechanism of "descent with modification" (473)?